The analyses dealing
with the IMF the students and the laymen read are beased on the holistic
idea that „a country”, be it in transition or ex-comunist, receives money
and credibility from the Fund („a very good thing”) in exchange for a commitment
to undertake reforms („a good thing” again). Instead of an assessment of
the impact of what the IMF does, we are facing detailed descriptions of
IMF programmes, being left with an unmistakable sensation that this should
be „the right thing”. Reasoning and argumentation are left out of the picture,
entirely displaced by sensations, by mythologies built on superstitions
and unproved statements, basing their strength on the acceptance of the
mob, the outcome of endless repetition.
There are devastating empirical studies describing in great detail the negative
results of the decades of IMF policies directed toward the undeveloped countries.
What we tried to highlight briefly in this short article was the fact that
those negative effects were not at all accidental, but built in the IMF
institutional framework and fundamental approach itself.